Abstract:
In this paper, we provide an efficient and easy-to-implement symmetric searchable encryption scheme (SSE) for string search, which takes one round of communication, O(n) times of computations over n documents. Unlike previous schemes, we use hash-chaining instead of chain of encryption operations for index generation, which makes it suitable for lightweight applications. Unlike the previous SSE schemes for string search, with our scheme, server learns nothing about the frequency and the relative positions of the words being searched except what it can learn from the history. We are the first to propose probabilistic trapdoors in SSE for string search. We provide concrete proof of non-adaptive security of our scheme against honest-but-curious server based on the definitions of [12]. We also introduce a new notion of search pattern privacy, which gives a measure of security against the leakage from trapdoor. We have shown that our scheme is secure under search pattern indistinguishability definition. We show why SSE scheme for string search cannot attain adaptive indistinguishability criteria as mentioned in [12]. We also propose modifications of our scheme so that the scheme can be used against active adversaries at the cost of more rounds of communications and memory space. We validate our scheme against two different commercial datasets